The Evolution of Cooperative Behavior
- Author:
- Alejandro Lynch
- Subject:
- Science and Technology
- Institution Name:
- University of Toronto
- Collection:
- Association for Biology Laboratory Education (ABLE)
- Grade Level:
- Post-secondary
- Abstract:
In this exercise students investigate the possibility of cooperative behavior to arise among unrelated individuals even in the presence of selfish individuals or individuals that do not care for the well- being of other organisms with which they interact. Is it possible for individuals to obtain the benefits of mutual cooperation but at the same time protect themselves from cheaters? Students play a game among themselves where they use a number of different strategies that are either cooperative or selfish. They will learn basic concepts of game theory and use these to examine the evolution of cooperative behavior. A computer simulation is available where students can expand the range of possibilities that are offered to them during the laboratory exercise.
- Course Type:
- Learning Module
- Languages:
- English
- Material Type:
- Activities and Labs, Lesson Plans
- Media Format:
- Downloadable docs
- Conditions of Use:
-
Custom Permissions
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. Use solely at one's own institution with no intent for profit is excluded from the preceding copyright restriction, unless otherwise noted on the copyright notice of the individual chapter in this volume. Proper credit to this publication must be included in your laboratory outline for each use; a sample citation is given [on the copyright page of each volume]. Upon obtaining permission or with the "sole use at one's own institution" exclusion, ABLE strongly encourages individuals to use the exercises in this proceedings volume in their teaching program.
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