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Keywords: Afghanistan
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- Abstract: Course mission: to explain and evaluate past and present United States policies. What caused the United States' past involvement in foreign wars and interventions? Were the results of U.S. policies good or bad? Would other policies have better served the U.S. and/or the wider world? Were the beliefs that guided U.S. policy true or false? If false, what explains these misperceptions? General theories that bear on the causes and consequences of American policy will be applied to explain and evaluate past and present policies. The history of United States foreign policy in the 20th century is covered in detail. Functional topics are also covered: U.S. military policy, U.S. foreign economic policy, and U.S. policy on human rights and democracy overseas. Finally, we will predict and prescribe for the future. What policies should the U.S. adopt toward current problems and crises? These problems include the war against Al Qaeda and the wider war on terror; Iraq and Saddam Hussein; the Taiwan Straits; the Central African conflicts; and more. What should be the U.S. stance on global environmental and human rights questions?
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- Abstract: Agha Ibrahim Akram was a lieutenant general who served in the Pakistan Army during the 1965 and 1971 wars with India. In this video segment, Akram recalls 1974 as the watershed year when India detonated a nuclear explosive and took one step toward becoming a nuclear power in hopes of enhancing its global status. That moment also coincided with skyrocketing oil prices, which stiffened Pakistan's resolve to develop nuclear energy for electricity and, if need be, weapons. The interview Akram conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'The Haves and Have-Nots' concentrates on the history of tension and conflict between Pakistan and India. He reviews the three wars: the devastating bloodshed that followed partition in 1947, the pride he felt in 1965 as chief of staff of an infantry division along the West Pakistan border, and his bitterness toward India over the Bangladesh war in 1971. Despite the persistence of tension between Pakistan and India, Akram recognizes circumstances in which their perspectives and geopolitical positions meet. For instance, he fully supports India's critique of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: that the major nuclear powers only selectively enforce and adhere to its provisions. He wishes that South Asia could be a nuclear-weapons-free zone but is willing to settle for India and Pakistan's interdependence: 'The two countries are the protagonists of South Asia. We'll actually cross the threshold together or not cross it at all.'
- Subject:
Humanities, Social Sciences, Science and Technology
- Collection:
WGBH Open Vault
(Complete Item Description)
- Abstract: Bruce Kent, ordained a Catholic minister in 1958, became general secretary of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in 1980 and chairman in 1987, the year he resigned from the ministry. In this video segment, he challenges the damaging spin that secretary for defense Lord Michael Heseltine used to undermine CND rather than engage in public debate about nuclear policy. Kent also refutes accusations that CND was in support of 'one-sided,' full unilateral disarmament. Instead, he argues for 'sufficiency' to replace 'parity' of nuclear forces. In the interview Kent conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'Zero Hour,' he describes the forces that converged to revive CND and the rallies that drew hundreds of thousands of marchers to the center of London in the early 1980s. He recounts the spread of peace movements to other Western European capitals, the partnership among protest leaders from these other countries, and some of the differences in their national agendas. The 1983 Conservative Party's rise to power on the heels of the Falklands War, coupled with its forceful campaign to mischaracterize CND, halted the movement's momentum. At this point, Kent recalls, CND shifted its agenda to 'the long haul,' prioritizing long-term, international public education over large demonstrations. Kent critiques 'flexible response' what he calls 'the Achilles' heel' of the Western alliance. Nuclear war is so clearly unwinnable, he maintains, that 'parity' must yield to 'sufficiency.' As Kent sees positions like these echoed in public discourse and arms negotiations, he concludes that CND's key contribution is helping 'some serious rethinking of the basics of the whole business.'
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- Abstract: Helmut Schmidt became the head of Germany's Social Democratic Party in 1967 and deputy chairman of the party in 1968. Between 1969 and 1972, he served as defense minister, minister for economics and finance, and minister of finance. From 1974 to 1982, he was the chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. In this video segment, Schmidt describes what he terms 'Euro-strategic' SS-20 missiles, which the Soviet Union began deploying along its western and southeastern borders in 1977. He viewed this deployment as destabilizing the nuclear balance in Europe, and he vigorously but unsuccessfully pressed President Jimmy Carter to include these missiles in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II negotiations. In the interview he conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'Carter's New World,' Schmidt recalls his anger and the political damage he suffered in 1978 when President Carter suddenly delayed his decision to produce the neutron bomb. He analyzes why the Soviet-U.S. relations deteriorated as the 1970s wore on, goes over Carter successor Ronald Reagan's initial receptivity to a 'zero-zero' option, relays the subsequent internal dissension and ascendancy of hardliners within the Reagan administration, and sheds light on the shift within the administration toward arms reductions. He recounts his conviction that the threat of deploying U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in response to the threat of the Soviet SS-20s brought the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. The Guadeloupe meeting that Schmidt helped organize produced the 'double-track decision' that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) council adopted at the end of 1979: to deploy the U.S. intermediate-range missiles while simultaneously bargaining them away in Geneva. Unlike some of his counterparts, Schmidt never feared the 'de-coupling' of the U.S. strategic deterrent from the defense of NATO Europe. He remained, though, keenly sensitive to the concentration of nuclear weapons deployed by other countries in the Federal Republic. In his interview, Schmidt explains the need for European collaboration in building up conventional forces to achieve both nuclear and non-nuclear parity between the Warsaw and NATO blocs.
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- Abstract: Denis Healey was the British secretary of state for defense from 1964 to 1970 and chancellor of the exchequer from 1974 to 1979. In this video segment, Healey reflects on the period in which he was defense secretary under Prime Minister Harold Wilson. He recalls the opposing interests of Germany and the United States with regard to nuclear strategy, explains his 'Healey theorem' of deterrence, and clarifies France's position that alliances can't coexist with nuclear weapons. Healey also assesses U.S. defense secretary Robert McNamara's quest for tidy solutions to 'insoluble' nuclear problems. In his interview conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'The Education of Robert McNamara,' Healey begins with a comparison between Soviet and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conventional military strength. He elaborates on France's opposition to the notion of 'extended deterrence' and on his own role in persuading NATO to adopt 'flexible response' strategy. He traces the evolution of his military analysis of massive retaliation, describes his collaboration with McNamara in developing flexible-response doctrine, reiterates the expectation that SALT III would follow shortly after a ratified SALT II Treaty, and shares how he ultimately lost faith in flexible response. He also discusses the extraordinary growth of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, Britain's response to the proposal for a Multilateral Force in the early 1960s, German chancellor Helmut Schmidt's distrust of U.S. president Jimmy Carter, and his own opposition to U.S. Euro-strategic missiles. As a fellow defense intellectual, Healey was encouraged by national security adviser Henry Kissinger's appointment: he was sure that detente could move forward. He admired Kissinger's boldness in dodging 'all official channels which he doesn't like anybody else doing,' but he was disappointed by Kissinger's failure to consult with allies. For the future, Healey believes that there should be fifty-percent reductions in strategic and conventional weapons, particularly when 'one side or the other has superiority.' He also advocates a 'nuclear-free corridor' to avoid accidental war.
- Subject:
Humanities, Social Sciences, Science and Technology, Business
- Collection:
WGBH Open Vault
(Complete Item Description)
- Abstract: In this Wide Angle video, Shugufa, a 13-year-old Afghani girl, attends schools where she studies religion, math and language and has made it to the 6th grade, surpassing all odds.
(Complete Item Description)
- Abstract: This Wide Angle video segment visits Afghanistan to explore the home life of Shugufa, a young girl caught between the traditions of Afghani society and modernization.
- Subject:
Social Sciences
- Grade Level:
Primary, Secondary
- Collection:
Teachers' Domain
(Complete Item Description)
- Abstract: Dean Rusk came from barefoot poverty in rural Georgia and achieved black-tie success. He was the first assistant secretary for UN Affairs, in 1949; assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs, in 1950; and the country's second-longest-serving secretary of state (1961 to 1969), after Cordell Hull. In this video segment, Rusk voices his opposition to the Strategic Defense Initiative, commonly known as 'Star Wars' and first unveiled in March 1983. In his interview conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'Visions of War and Peace,' Rusk reflects on a wide range of political and nuclear issues spanning more than forty years. He discusses his recognition that the first atomic bomb introduced a 'new phase of warfare'; his opinion that Soviet premier Joseph Stalin's 'adventures' spawned the Cold War and the United States' 'containment' policy; how the past three decades created a vastly different diplomatic landscape against which to conduct foreign relations; and the urgency of domestic problems that threaten national security. Although known throughout his career for his hawkish views, in 'Visions of War and Peace' Rusk turns again and again to the dominant lesson of the nuclear age: nuclear war is 'simply that war which must never be fought.'
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