Agha Ibrahim Akram was a lieutenant general who served in the Pakistan Army during the 1965 and 1971 wars with India. In this video segment, Akram recalls 1974 as the watershed year when India detonated a nuclear explosive and took one step toward becoming a nuclear power in hopes of enhancing its global status. That moment also coincided with skyrocketing oil prices, which stiffened Pakistan's resolve to develop nuclear energy for electricity and, if need be, weapons. The interview Akram conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'The Haves and Have-Nots' concentrates on the history of tension and conflict between Pakistan and India. He reviews the three wars: the devastating bloodshed that followed partition in 1947, the pride he felt in 1965 as chief of staff of an infantry division along the West Pakistan border, and his bitterness toward India over the Bangladesh war in 1971. Despite the persistence of tension between Pakistan and India, Akram recognizes circumstances in which their perspectives and geopolitical positions meet. For instance, he fully supports India's critique of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: that the major nuclear powers only selectively enforce and adhere to its provisions. He wishes that South Asia could be a nuclear-weapons-free zone but is willing to settle for India and Pakistan's interdependence: 'The two countries are the protagonists of South Asia. We'll actually cross the threshold together or not cross it at all.'

Bruce Kent, ordained a Catholic minister in 1958, became general secretary of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in 1980 and chairman in 1987, the year he resigned from the ministry. In this video segment, he challenges the damaging spin that secretary for defense Lord Michael Heseltine used to undermine CND rather than engage in public debate about nuclear policy. Kent also refutes accusations that CND was in support of 'one-sided,' full unilateral disarmament. Instead, he argues for 'sufficiency' to replace 'parity' of nuclear forces. In the interview Kent conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'Zero Hour,' he describes the forces that converged to revive CND and the rallies that drew hundreds of thousands of marchers to the center of London in the early 1980s. He recounts the spread of peace movements to other Western European capitals, the partnership among protest leaders from these other countries, and some of the differences in their national agendas. The 1983 Conservative Party's rise to power on the heels of the Falklands War, coupled with its forceful campaign to mischaracterize CND, halted the movement's momentum. At this point, Kent recalls, CND shifted its agenda to 'the long haul,' prioritizing long-term, international public education over large demonstrations. Kent critiques 'flexible response' what he calls 'the Achilles' heel' of the Western alliance. Nuclear war is so clearly unwinnable, he maintains, that 'parity' must yield to 'sufficiency.' As Kent sees positions like these echoed in public discourse and arms negotiations, he concludes that CND's key contribution is helping 'some serious rethinking of the basics of the whole business.'

Dr. Randall Forsberg is executive director of the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies, a think tank she founded in 1980 with the aim of reducing the risk of war and minimizing the burden of U.S. military spending. In this video segment, she describes the reach of grassroots activism at the height of 1982's national Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, which called for a bilateral, verifiable halt to new production of nuclear weapons. In the interview she conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'Visions of War and Peace,' Forsberg describes the genesis of the movement, which was born from the failure of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II and from public awareness of the development of a new generation of war-fighting systems. Forsberg traces the town-by-town growth of the anti-nuclear petition, which began in 1980 with the four-page document 'Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race,' and the referendum process that fanned out across the nation but remained largely ignored by the national media. Forsberg details the negative reaction by President Ronald Reagan's administration and the ensuing support on Capitol Hill, which passed a freeze resolution. This was followed just weeks later by congressional approval of the MX missile by an equally large margin-a vote that Forsberg says 'tore up the movement.' Soon afterward, President Reagan suddenly announced the Strategic Defense Initiative-a program that Forsberg critiques at the end of her interview-and he agreed to negotiate with the Soviet Union, which was a key goal of 'Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race.' The lasting impact of the nuclear-freeze movement, says Forsberg, has been a shift away from public protest and toward grassroots, long-term education. She concludes that this new 'institutionalized peace movement' will re-emerge more informed and cohesive than the last, with the determination to change 'the direction of the permanent peacetime policy of the United States.'

Denis Healey was the British secretary of state for defense from 1964 to 1970 and chancellor of the exchequer from 1974 to 1979. In this video segment, Healey reflects on the period in which he was defense secretary under Prime Minister Harold Wilson. He recalls the opposing interests of Germany and the United States with regard to nuclear strategy, explains his 'Healey theorem' of deterrence, and clarifies France's position that alliances can't coexist with nuclear weapons. Healey also assesses U.S. defense secretary Robert McNamara's quest for tidy solutions to 'insoluble' nuclear problems. In his interview conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'The Education of Robert McNamara,' Healey begins with a comparison between Soviet and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conventional military strength. He elaborates on France's opposition to the notion of 'extended deterrence' and on his own role in persuading NATO to adopt 'flexible response' strategy. He traces the evolution of his military analysis of massive retaliation, describes his collaboration with McNamara in developing flexible-response doctrine, reiterates the expectation that SALT III would follow shortly after a ratified SALT II Treaty, and shares how he ultimately lost faith in flexible response. He also discusses the extraordinary growth of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, Britain's response to the proposal for a Multilateral Force in the early 1960s, German chancellor Helmut Schmidt's distrust of U.S. president Jimmy Carter, and his own opposition to U.S. Euro-strategic missiles. As a fellow defense intellectual, Healey was encouraged by national security adviser Henry Kissinger's appointment: he was sure that detente could move forward. He admired Kissinger's boldness in dodging 'all official channels which he doesn't like anybody else doing,' but he was disappointed by Kissinger's failure to consult with allies. For the future, Healey believes that there should be fifty-percent reductions in strategic and conventional weapons, particularly when 'one side or the other has superiority.' He also advocates a 'nuclear-free corridor' to avoid accidental war.

Chandra Shekhar Jha was India's foreign secretary from 1965 to 1967. In this video segment, Jha explains why India cannot exclude the future possibility of owning nuclear weapons. The key to disarmament, he insists, rests with the nuclear nations that are 'adding to their stockpiles' and 'preparing for war. 'Jha's interview conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'The Haves and Have-Nots' begins with his recollections of his devastating post-war tour of Japan with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and their shared ideals of disarmament and economic development by harnessing 'Atoms for Peace.' Jha's interview also examines the dilemma of staying the non-nuclear course given regional security concerns: the 1962 Chinese attack on India, followed two years later by China's detonation of its first nuclear bomb, and ongoing tensions with its neighbor Pakistan. While prioritizing the country's economic development over diverting resources to acquire nuclear weapons, Jha rejects the Non-Proliferation Treaty as embodying 'nuclear colonialism' and objects to the preferential treatment granted other threshold states.

As staff secretary to President Dwight Eisenhower from 1954 to 1961, General Andrew Goodpaster was the person most privy to Eisenhower's thinking and key decisions during his White House years. Goodpaster began his long affiliation with Eisenhower as a staff officer under his leadership of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and he went on to become the president's right-hand man on security matters. In this video segment, Goodpaster describes the inter-service rivalries that led Eisenhower to reorganize and centralize the armed forces, reflecting his general belief in systematic, integrated planning. Goodpaster's interview conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'A Bigger Bang for the Buck,' provides an intimate portrait of Eisenhower's leadership style and approach to policymaking. He describes how the president handled immense pressure to intervene in South and Southeast Asia as well as demands for a crash military buildup in the wake of bomber-gap and missile-gap reports. Goodpaster recalls that Eisenhower always saw Europe as vital to U.S. interests and repeatedly advocated strengthening the European alliance. The administration ushered in what came to be known as the "New Look" to sustain containment over the long term at a tolerable cost. Goodpaster describes a president confident in his military judgment despite the criticism that his administration endured. The introduction of 'massive retaliation' became the most controversial policy of the Eisenhower administration, and the downing of a U-2 spy plane dealt the gravest injury to his presidency. Goodpaster returns several times to the impact that the introduction of thermonuclear weapons had on Eisenhower's thinking, fueling the president's strong interest in 'Atoms for Peace,' limited arms control, and negotiation.

" This course will expose students to tools and methods of analysis for use in assessing the challenges and dangers associated with nuclear weapons in international politics. The first two weeks of the course will look at the technology and design of nuclear weapons and their means of production. The next five weeks will look at the role they played in the Cold War, the organizations that managed them, the technologies that were developed to deliver them, and the methods used to analyze nuclear force structures and model nuclear exchanges. The last six weeks of the course will look at theories and cases of nuclear decision making beyond the original five weapon states, and will look particularly at why states pursue or forego nuclear weapons, the role that individuals and institutions play, and the potential for both new sources of proliferation and new consequences."

Dean Rusk came from barefoot poverty in rural Georgia and achieved black-tie success. He was the first assistant secretary for UN Affairs, in 1949; assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs, in 1950; and the country's second-longest-serving secretary of state (1961 to 1969), after Cordell Hull. In this video segment, Rusk voices his opposition to the Strategic Defense Initiative, commonly known as 'Star Wars' and first unveiled in March 1983. In his interview conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'Visions of War and Peace,' Rusk reflects on a wide range of political and nuclear issues spanning more than forty years. He discusses his recognition that the first atomic bomb introduced a 'new phase of warfare'; his opinion that Soviet premier Joseph Stalin's 'adventures' spawned the Cold War and the United States' 'containment' policy; how the past three decades created a vastly different diplomatic landscape against which to conduct foreign relations; and the urgency of domestic problems that threaten national security. Although known throughout his career for his hawkish views, in 'Visions of War and Peace' Rusk turns again and again to the dominant lesson of the nuclear age: nuclear war is 'simply that war which must never be fought.'