The Art of the Probable" addresses the history of scientific ideas, in particular the emergence and development of mathematical probability. But it is neither meant to be a history of the exact sciences per se nor an annex to, say, the Course 6 curriculum in probability and statistics. Rather, our objective is to focus on the formal, thematic, and rhetorical features that imaginative literature shares with texts in the history of probability. These shared issues include (but are not limited to): the attempt to quantify or otherwise explain the presence of chance, risk, and contingency in everyday life; the deduction of causes for phenomena that are knowable only in their effects; and, above all, the question of what it means to think and act rationally in an uncertain world. Our course therefore aims to broaden students’ appreciation for and understanding of how literature interacts with--both reflecting upon and contributing to--the scientific understanding of the world. We are just as centrally committed to encouraging students to regard imaginative literature as a unique contribution to knowledge in its own right, and to see literary works of art as objects that demand and richly repay close critical analysis. It is our hope that the course will serve students well if they elect to pursue further work in Literature or other discipline in SHASS, and also enrich or complement their understanding of probability and statistics in other scientific and engineering subjects they elect to take.

Culture, Embodiment, and the Senses will provide an historical and cross-cultural analysis of the politics of sensory experience. The subject will address western philosophical debates about mind, brain, emotion, and the body and the historical value placed upon sight, reason, and rationality, versus smell, taste, and touch as acceptable modes of knowing and knowledge production. We will assess cultural traditions that challenge scientific interpretations of experience arising from western philosophical and physiological models. The class will examine how sensory experience lies beyond the realm of individual physiological or psychological responses and occurs within a culturally elaborated field of social relations. Finally, we will debate how discourse about the senses is a product of particular modes of knowledge production that are themselves contested fields of power relations.

This work attempts to describe the nature of the evolution of the non-spatial (material) universe, the universe as seen through the semi-idealistic framework of the NSTP (Non ? Spatial Thinking Process) theory. As per the NSTP theory, the existence of the superhuman mind (i.e. NSTPs) is responsible for the orderly existence of the non-superhuman mind/s (i.e. NSTP/s).These superhuman NSTPs, representing the empirical laws/design of the (non-spatial) material universe, could be called as the design (superhuman) NSTPs. This design came into existence due to some designer (superhuman) mind (i.e. NSTP), which no longer exists. Further, there should be some other design (superhuman) NSTPs responsible for the orderly existence of the designer (superhuman) NSTP, and so on. Such is supposed to be the nature of the evolution of the non-spatial (material) universe.

This course covers the following topics: an introduction to philosophy; philosophy of religion; epistemology; the philosophy of mind; free-will and determinism; ethics and metaphysics.

The metaphysical semi-solipsism is a position that within the semi-idealistic framework of the NSTP (Non – Spatial Thinking Process) theory, ‘I’ and ‘the superhuman mind’ are the only material entities that exist. That is, only my NSTP and the superhuman NSTP/s exist. It is called semi-solipsism because unlike pure/conventional solipsism it asserts the existence of mind, i.e. the superhuman mind, other than one’s own. This position is based on the argument that ‘the non-existence of other non-superhuman minds/NSTPs simply makes the universal design simpler, i.e. it makes the superhuman engine less complicated, since the engine needs no additional intelligence/information to create a variety of specific spatial illusions through multiple (non-superhuman) NSTPs’.

Study of basic metaphysical issues concerning existence, the mind-body problem, personal identity, and causation plus its implications for freedom. Classical as well as contemporary readings.

This class is an introduction to many of the central issues in a branch of philosophy called philosophy of mind. Some of the questions we will discuss include the following. Can computers think? Is the mind an immaterial thing? Or is the mind the brain? Or does the mind stand to the brain as a computer program stands to the hardware? How can creatures like ourselves think thoughts that are "about" things? (For example, we can all think that Aristotle is a philosopher, and in that sense think "about" Aristotle, but what is the explanation of this quite remarkable ability?) Can I know whether your experiences and my experiences when we look at raspberries, fire trucks and stop lights are the same? Can consciousness be given a scientific explanation?

This unit examines the philosophical questions surrounding the mind. You will examine how beliefs have changed over the centuries and be able to contrast the views of Descartes with more modern ideas.

This course will consider the degree and nature of the modular organization of the mind and brain. We will focus in detail on the domains of objects, number, places, and people, drawing on evidence from behavioral studies in human infants, children, normal adults, neurological patients, and animals, as well as from studies using neural measures such as functional brain imaging and ERPs. With these domains as examples, we will address broader questions about the role of domain-general and domain-specific processing systems in mature human performance, the innateness vs. plasticity of encapsulated cognitive systems, the nature of the evidence for such systems, and the processes by which people link information flexibly across domains.

This course explores the social relevance of neuroscience, considering how emerging areas of brain research at once reflect and reshape social attitudes and agendas. Topics include brain imaging and popular media; neuroscience of empathy, trust, and moral reasoning; new fields of neuroeconomics and neuromarketing; ethical implications of neurotechnologies such as cognitive enhancement pharmaceuticals; neuroscience in the courtroom; and neuroscientific recasting of social problems such as addiction and violence. Guest lectures by neuroscientists, class discussion, and weekly readings in neuroscience, popular media, and science studies.

This work lists some of the problems that I find supportive of metaphysical/philosophy of mind idealism.

" The science essay uses science to think about the human condition; it uses humanistic thinking to reflect on the possibilities and limits of science and technology. In this class we read and practice writing science essays of varied lengths and purposes. We will read a wide variety of science essays, ranging across disciplines, both to learn more about this genre and to inspire your own writing. This semester's reading centers on "The Dark Side," with essays ranging from Alan Lightman's "Prisoner of the Wired World" through Robin Marantz Henig's cautionary account of nano-technology ("Our Silver-Coated Future") to David Quammen's investigation of diseases that jump from animals to humans ("Deadly Contact")."

The purpose of this work is to discuss whether a criminal solipsist should be acquitted. A solipsist is generally a one who believes that other apparently animate (and also inanimate) entities have no feeling/s or state/s of consciousness associated with them. Therefore, considering that solipsism makes sense, a solipsist tends to have no criminal mind, and thus they could be justly accused only in a conventional sense. This work discusses the definition and types of solipsism, the types of solipsistic crimes, the psychology of a judge, and the positive as well as the negative consequences of such acquittal as well as conviction. The work finally concludes in the favour of acquittal in the case of some specific solipsists committing some particular types of crime.

This work attempts to demonstrate the significant possibility (as contrast to the superhyperbolic or the least possibility) in an apparently inanimate thing, like a stone, being conscious. According to the semi-idealistic framework of the NSTP (Non – Spatial Thinking Process) theory, any spatial, and therefore illusive/virtual, entity may have (real non-spatial) feelings/states of consciousness associated with it, provided it has an appropriate conceptual representation in the superhuman engine. A stone, for example, being an apparently spatial entity, may have conceptual representation in the superhuman mind/NSTPs/engine so as to be conscious. Thus, it may be that a broken stone feels pain till its death and then its pieces become conscious. The kind/type of states of consciousness associated with a stone depends entirely upon the kind/type of conceptual representation it has in the superhuman engine.

This is a seminar on "self-knowledge" -- knowledge of one's own mental states. In addition to reading some of the classic papers on self-knowledge, we will look at some very recent work on the topic. There will be no lectures. Each week I will spend half an hour or so introducing the assigned reading, and the rest of the time will be devoted to discussion.