The Art of the Probable" addresses the history of scientific ideas, in particular the emergence and development of mathematical probability. But it is neither meant to be a history of the exact sciences per se nor an annex to, say, the Course 6 curriculum in probability and statistics. Rather, our objective is to focus on the formal, thematic, and rhetorical features that imaginative literature shares with texts in the history of probability. These shared issues include (but are not limited to): the attempt to quantify or otherwise explain the presence of chance, risk, and contingency in everyday life; the deduction of causes for phenomena that are knowable only in their effects; and, above all, the question of what it means to think and act rationally in an uncertain world. Our course therefore aims to broaden students’ appreciation for and understanding of how literature interacts with--both reflecting upon and contributing to--the scientific understanding of the world. We are just as centrally committed to encouraging students to regard imaginative literature as a unique contribution to knowledge in its own right, and to see literary works of art as objects that demand and richly repay close critical analysis. It is our hope that the course will serve students well if they elect to pursue further work in Literature or other discipline in SHASS, and also enrich or complement their understanding of probability and statistics in other scientific and engineering subjects they elect to take.

Emphasis will be placed upon application of psychological knowledge to daily situations, and upon accessing and assessing information from a variety of sources about behavior. Skills in scientific reasoning and critical thinking will be developed during this course. Areas of psychology to be included are: research methods, neuroscience, human development, perception, consciousness, learning, memory, intelligence, motivation, emotion, personality, psychological disorders, psychotherapy, stress and health, and social psychology.

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As staff secretary to President Dwight Eisenhower from 1954 to 1961, General Andrew Goodpaster was the person most privy to Eisenhower's thinking and key decisions during his White House years. Goodpaster began his long affiliation with Eisenhower as a staff officer under his leadership of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and he went on to become the president's right-hand man on security matters. In this video segment, Goodpaster describes the inter-service rivalries that led Eisenhower to reorganize and centralize the armed forces, reflecting his general belief in systematic, integrated planning. Goodpaster's interview conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'A Bigger Bang for the Buck,' provides an intimate portrait of Eisenhower's leadership style and approach to policymaking. He describes how the president handled immense pressure to intervene in South and Southeast Asia as well as demands for a crash military buildup in the wake of bomber-gap and missile-gap reports. Goodpaster recalls that Eisenhower always saw Europe as vital to U.S. interests and repeatedly advocated strengthening the European alliance. The administration ushered in what came to be known as the "New Look" to sustain containment over the long term at a tolerable cost. Goodpaster describes a president confident in his military judgment despite the criticism that his administration endured. The introduction of 'massive retaliation' became the most controversial policy of the Eisenhower administration, and the downing of a U-2 spy plane dealt the gravest injury to his presidency. Goodpaster returns several times to the impact that the introduction of thermonuclear weapons had on Eisenhower's thinking, fueling the president's strong interest in 'Atoms for Peace,' limited arms control, and negotiation.

At age twenty-seven, physicist Philip Morrison joined the Manhattan Project, the code name given to the U.S. government's covert effort at Los Alamos to develop the first nuclear weapon. The Manhattan Project was also the most expensive single program ever financed by public funds. In this video segment, Morrison describes the charismatic leadership of his mentor, J. Robert Oppenheimer, and the urgency of their mission to manufacture a weapon 'which if we didn't make first would lead to the loss of the war." In the interview Morrison conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'Dawn,' he describes the remote, inaccessible setting of the laboratory that operated in extreme secrecy. It was this physical isolation, he maintains, that allowed scientists extraordinary freedom to exchange ideas with fellow physicists. Morrison also reflects on his wartime fears. Germany had many of the greatest minds in physics and engineering, which created tremendous anxiety among Allied scientists that it would win the atomic race and the war, and Morrison recalls the elaborate schemes he devised to determine that country's atomic progress. At the time that he was helping assemble the world's first atomic bomb, Morrison believed that nuclear weapons 'could be made part of the construction of the peace.' A month after the war, he toured Hiroshima, and for several years thereafter he testified, became a public spokesman, and lobbied for international nuclear cooperation. After leaving Los Alamos, Morrison returned to academia. For the rest of his life he was a forceful voice against nuclear weapons.

This course surveys questions about human behavior and mental life ranging from how you see to why you fall in love. The great controversies: nature and nurture, free will, consciousness, human differences, self and society. Students are exposed to the range of theoretical perspectives including biological, evolutionary, cognitive, and psychoanalytic. One of the best aspects of Psychology is that you are the subject matter. This makes it possible to do many demonstrations in lecture that allow you to experience the topic under study. Lectures work in tandem with the textbook. The course breaks into small recitations sections to allow discussion, oral presentations, and individual contact with instructors.

Developmental psychology concerns itself with the changes (psychological and otherwise) that occur as a result of our physical and mental maturation. This course proceeds from prenatal development through adolescent and adult development. Upon successful completion of this course, the student will be able to: Discuss the interaction between and the roles of nature and nurture in lifespan development.; Describe the basic development of the human nervous system; Explain the developmental processes associated with the five senses; Describe the important developmental milestones and age expectations associated with motor skills, social skills, cognitive ability, sensory awareness, and the use of language; Discuss the important theories of cognitive development, including those of Piaget, Vygotsky, the information-processing approach, and the intelligence perspective; Discuss and contrast the nativist, behavioral-cognitive, functionalist, and learning stage theories of language development; Describe the developmental process of language, from cooing and babbling to mature language; Explain the important theoretical issues in the study of the development of personality; Discuss the most influential theories of personality development, including those of Freud, Erikson, Klein and Mahler, Bowlby, and Ainsworth; Explain Kohlberg's theory of moral development, including the perspectives of its critics; Describe the physical and cognitive changes associated with adolescent development; Explain the significance of the differences in maturation rates between individuals; Discuss the major issues of development in adulthood, including marriage and divorce, parenting, and mid-/later-life physical and cognitive changes. (Psychology 302a)

Henry Kissinger, U.S. national security adviser from 1969 to 1973 and then secretary of state until 1977, was the dominant figure in creating the foreign policy of the Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford administrations. This video segment deals with the concept of "linkage": interlocking U.S. arms-control negotiations with leveraging Soviet behavior and policy.

Kissinger's interview conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: "One Step Forward" touches on points contained in his blueprint for de: a relaxing of tensions between the superpowers. Detente was designed to "contain" Soviet influence and power, based on a combination of pressures and inducements. Kissinger speaks to issues of nuclear parity, its influence on negotiations, and the breakthrough in Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) once the Soviet Union agreed to link offensive and defensive weapons. He also addresses the significance of opening relations with China; his "back channel" diplomacy with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin independent of the SALT delegation; the controversy surrounding multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs); and the significance of the SALT I Treaty as a frame of reference for future negotiations. What followed, Kissinger recalls, was a general antagonism toward SALT II, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to link trade with improving human rights within the Soviet Union, and the problems for arms control created by MIRVs-all of which coincided with the fall of Nixon.

Alain Enthoven, an MIT economist, was the country's first assistant secretary of defense for systems analysis from 1965 to 1969. In this video segment, Enthoven recounts how public interpretation of 'flexible response' strategy ran counter to both the administration's overriding goal-to prevent nuclear war-and its bottom line: that nuclear war is unwinnable. In his interview conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'The Education of Robert McNamara,' Enthoven sets the stage for the missile age. He discusses how the arrival of nuclear weapons that could reach the United States made it necessary to rethink military strategy and the nation's overall defense posture. What was new, he points out, was the establishment of systems analysis for making key decisions on force requirements, weapon systems, targeting theory, and other military matters. He recalls that dismissing 'massive retaliation' and the untenable consequences it posed, canceling an array of bomber and ballistic programs, and focusing on a conventional military buildup and a survivable retaliatory force generated immense controversy among U.S. military circles and European partners in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

This course explores the social relevance of neuroscience, considering how emerging areas of brain research at once reflect and reshape social attitudes and agendas. Topics include brain imaging and popular media; neuroscience of empathy, trust, and moral reasoning; new fields of neuroeconomics and neuromarketing; ethical implications of neurotechnologies such as cognitive enhancement pharmaceuticals; neuroscience in the courtroom; and neuroscientific recasting of social problems such as addiction and violence. Guest lectures by neuroscientists, class discussion, and weekly readings in neuroscience, popular media, and science studies.

This course will examine the origins, structure and functions of the U.S. Intelligence Community and its relationship to national security policy. It will look in some detail at the key intelligence agencies and the functions they perform, including collection, analysis, counterintelligence and covert action. It will also look at some of the key intelligence missions, such as strategic warning, counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and counterinsurgency. Finally, it will examine some of the major controversies concerning intelligence, including its successes and failures, relationship to policymakers, congressional oversight, and the need for reform.

Dean Rusk came from barefoot poverty in rural Georgia and achieved black-tie success. He was the first assistant secretary for UN Affairs, in 1949; assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs, in 1950; and the country's second-longest-serving secretary of state (1961 to 1969), after Cordell Hull. In this video segment, Rusk voices his opposition to the Strategic Defense Initiative, commonly known as 'Star Wars' and first unveiled in March 1983. In his interview conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'Visions of War and Peace,' Rusk reflects on a wide range of political and nuclear issues spanning more than forty years. He discusses his recognition that the first atomic bomb introduced a 'new phase of warfare'; his opinion that Soviet premier Joseph Stalin's 'adventures' spawned the Cold War and the United States' 'containment' policy; how the past three decades created a vastly different diplomatic landscape against which to conduct foreign relations; and the urgency of domestic problems that threaten national security. Although known throughout his career for his hawkish views, in 'Visions of War and Peace' Rusk turns again and again to the dominant lesson of the nuclear age: nuclear war is 'simply that war which must never be fought.'