You will determine what you will and will not see during your vacation based on the tourist information at hand and you will educate yourself about the region.

Andrei Gromyko served as Soviet foreign minister from 1957 to 1985. Beginning in 1943, when Soviet premier Joseph Stalin appointed the 34-year-old ambassador to Washington, Gromyko was an indispensable formulator of Kremlin policy toward the United States. Ultimately, he dealt with nine U.S. presidents. In this video segment, Gromyko chronicles the arms race, beginning in the 1950s under General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. At the time, each superpower had the ability to inflict "unacceptable damage" on the other. Still, neither side acted to stop the arms race until General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev opened the new era in the mid eighties. Under the leadership of Gorbachev, Gromyko concludes, Soviets have embraced the "principle of rational sufficiency" and initiated unilateral steps to stop the arms race. The interview Gromyko conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age is a wide-ranging reflection on nuclear strategy, foreign policy, and superpower diplomacy during the four-and-a-half decades since the dawn of the nuclear age. Gromyko begins the interview with a look at the Potsdam Conference, at which U.S. president Harry S. Truman informed Soviet premier Joseph Stalin that an atomic bomb had successfully detonated. Truman was perplexed by the non-reaction of the Soviet leader, who then submitted a private order to accelerate the Russian bomb project. Gromyko remembers how, following the war, it felt, at age 37, to challenge the experienced architects of the Cold War and the policies they conceived: the Baruch Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan. He recalls that Soviet proposals to ban all nuclear weapons and to place strict controls on facilities pursuing nuclear energy were "categorically rejected." Western powers, Gromyko asserts, missed the opportunity to stop the arms race before it began. He points to "a drastic hardening" of foreign policy, citing former Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill's 1946 "Iron Curtain" speech as an "open declaration of the Cold War." Gromyko reserves his strongest criticism for the "doctrine of intimidation," the United States' classified National Security Memorandum 68, which marked a dramatic shift in U.S.-Soviet relations. His description of the 1962 Caribbean crisis stands in stark contrast to U.S. officials' accounts of the same episode, known as the Cuban missile crisis. He provides detailed recollections of his conversation with President John F. Kennedy during this period, concluding that it was "probably the most difficult meeting I experienced in all my 48 years of meeting presidents of the United States." Gromyko moves ahead to the period of detente. His retelling of last-minute changes prior to the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I differs from that of national security adviser Henry Kissinger. Gromyko discusses the key Soviet objection to U.S. proposals during SALT II negotiations: the United States, which targeted the Soviet Union with forward bases around the world, demanded drastic reductions in the Soviet Union's principal deterrent-the heavy intercontinental ballistic missile. At Vladivostok in 1974, the two sides agreed on a basic framework for the SALT II Treaty, which was signed five years later. Reflecting on the trends he has observed during his long career as Soviet foreign minister, Gromyko sees more continuity than difference: each administration has tried to achieve military superiority, and the Soviet Union, always one step behind, has pressed to maintain "virtual parity" to safeguard its national interests. Much was achieved during detente, he recalls. While that term is no longer used, Gromyko sees parallels with-and holds out hope for-the current process of "deepening mutual understand and trust."

Analyzes the impact of trade and financial flows and regional integration on the domestic politics of advanced industrial states. Pressures for harmonization and convergence of domestic institutions and practices and the sources of national resistance to these are examined. Cases include European Union and West European states, US, and Japan. This is a graduate seminar for students who already have some familiarity with issues in political economy and/or European politics. The objective is to examine the ways in which changes in the international economy and the regimes that regulate it interact with domestic politics, policy-making, and the institutional structures of the political economy in industrialized democracies.

Examines role of European states in postwar period of rapid economic growth and current crisis. Includes analysis of different state traditions ("etatist," liberal, authoritarian); government's role in decline of some economies and rise of others; why and where Keynesianism, indicative planning, and state enterprises were introduced; alternative conceptions of contemporary economic problems (new international division of labor? too few producers? oil shock?); and of policies to deal with them (industrial policy? monetarism? protectionism?).

For nearly half a century, Paul Nitze was one of the chief architects of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. In 1961, President John F. Kennedy appointed Nitze assistant secretary of defense for International Security Affairs. In this video segment, Nitze describes key issues confronting the incoming Kennedy administration. This transition period focused on the goals of the country's nuclear-strategic policy; how to approach crises in every region, from the Middle East to Vietnam; and whether to unify the armed services. Included are Nitze's recommendations regarding a conventional military buildup and a 'no-cities' policy, which would target military forces instead of civilian populations. Nitze's interview conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'At the Brink' moves the viewer through his work with the World War II Strategic Bombing Survey, which placed him in Hiroshima and Nagasaki soon after the atomic bombs were dropped. From 1950 to 1953, Nitze served as director of the State Department's Policy Planning staff, and from 1961 to 1963 he was assistant defense secretary. As his interview reveals, Nitze held key positions during the period after World War II when the United States emerged as a superpower and Cold War strategic policies were being debated and defined. His classified 1950 report, National Security Memorandum 68, remains a seminal document: it was initially designed to persuade President Harry S. Truman that an increasingly menacing world required major increases in spending on defense and foreign military assistance. Nitze was also a major contributor to the Gaither Report, which stressed the need for a survivable nuclear deterrent by citing the vulnerability of the U.S. bomber force. Nitze opposed the doctrine of massive retaliation from the moment John Foster Dulles announced it at a dinner party in 1954. He was involved in crisis contingency planning, including the Berlin blockade and airlift in 1948, construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. During the missile crisis, Nitze recalls, he worked out the scenarios of increasing military escalation to pressure the Soviets to withdraw the missiles. Finally, he describes his disappointment that, although Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara initially embraced his no-cities strategy, following the Cuban missile crisis McNamara entirely abandoned the notion of winnable nuclear war.

Harry McPherson was special counsel to U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson from 1966 to 1969. In this video segment, McPherson captures the thinking behind Johnson's internal stalemate: his anguish over the Vietnam War; his diminished political strength; his tension-filled relationship with newly appointed defense secretary Clark Clifford, who pushed to de-escalate; and Johnson's own inability to let go. In the interview he conducted for Vietnam: A Television History, 'Tet 1968,' McPherson provides an intimate portrait of that year in the White House. He describes conversations in which he participated; President Johnson's state of mind; and the impact on the administration as 'contributing nation' allies, Congress, advisers, and public opinion turned against the war. McPherson begins the interview by recalling the conflicted mood at the White House following the Tet Offensive. The optimism found in military cables and official information clashed with televised images showing the nation that the war was resulting in massive loss of human life and that a prisoner could be shot at point-blank range. McPherson's account also follows the internal politics of the Johnson administration from 1964 to 1966. President Johnson's domestic agenda was swallowed by a war he doubted privately; U.S. involvement in Vietnam deepened considerably even as public confidence eroded; Democrats suffered midterm-election defeats. Defense secretary Robert McNamara, who was a key architect of U.S. policy in Vietnam, became convinced that the war was unwinnable and resigned shortly after Tet. McPherson remembers a luncheon at which McNamara, his voice breaking, spoke of the 'crushing futility' of the air campaign that he 'had ultimate responsibility for.' The arrival of Clark Clifford as the new defense secretary set in motion a sea change of opinion in the White House-namely the recognition, finally, that continuing to escalate troop levels was doing nothing to stem North Vietnam's war of attrition with the United States. McPherson recounts his burgeoning alliance with Secretary Clifford, who stated, 'Together we'll get this country and our president out of this mess.' McPherson talks in great detail about the three-month process of writing the president's pivotal speech to be televised at the end of March. He recalls reworking drafts as the administration debated whether to continue, increase, or selectively arrest bombing as a prelude to peace talks a proposal that McPherson presented and that was eventually adopted. Given the change in policy, the speech required a new ending, which Johnson himself decided to write. On March 31, 1968, the president stunned the world with his announcement that he would not seek reelection. Reflecting on the Vietnam experience, McPherson probes the feasibility of fighting a limited war. He ends his interview with a personal sketch of President Johnson, a complex and tragic figure. McPherson considered him brilliant in 'sheer intellectual mental horsepower' and 'the smartest man I ever saw.'

Flyover of northern Florida as seen by SeaWiFS on June 22, 1998

Zoom in to northern Florida as seen by SeaWiFS on June 22, 1998

A slow flyby of southern Europe, using SeaWiFS imagery

Dean Rusk came from barefoot poverty in rural Georgia and achieved black-tie success. He was the first assistant secretary for UN Affairs, in 1949; assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs, in 1950; and the country's second-longest-serving secretary of state (1961 to 1969), after Cordell Hull. In this video segment, Rusk voices his opposition to the Strategic Defense Initiative, commonly known as 'Star Wars' and first unveiled in March 1983. In his interview conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'Visions of War and Peace,' Rusk reflects on a wide range of political and nuclear issues spanning more than forty years. He discusses his recognition that the first atomic bomb introduced a 'new phase of warfare'; his opinion that Soviet premier Joseph Stalin's 'adventures' spawned the Cold War and the United States' 'containment' policy; how the past three decades created a vastly different diplomatic landscape against which to conduct foreign relations; and the urgency of domestic problems that threaten national security. Although known throughout his career for his hawkish views, in 'Visions of War and Peace' Rusk turns again and again to the dominant lesson of the nuclear age: nuclear war is 'simply that war which must never be fought.'

Dr. Randall Forsberg is executive director of the think tank she founded in 1980, the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies. In this video segment, she recalls the moment during arms negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union when she determined that the arms race is not driven by basic deterrence but by the imperative to gain superiority in threatening to win-without actually waging-nuclear war.In her wide-ranging interview for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'Visions of War and Peace,' Forsberg explores war-and-peace issues, military doctrine, the history and economics of nuclear-weapons development and policy, war-fighting capability and force structure, scenarios and resistance to arms reduction, the history of relations between the superpowers, and their interactions with developing nations. Seven countries, she asserts, account for 99 percent of nuclear weapons. The dispersal of weapons-in the form of the Rapid Deployment Force, tactical weapons, and missiles fitted with multiple warheads-heightens the risk of war in a world moving toward becoming what she calls 'a global nuclear porcupine.' Forsberg asserts that 'threatening to commit genocide as a way of conducting politics' is one of the most 'deeply immoral and subversive acts of government in the modern world.' Moreover, she maintains, a conventional military crisis could easily cross that nuclear threshold. Forsberg advocates the three Rs: 'reduce, restructure, and restrain' conventional forces-the other side of the military coin-that consume 75 percent of the U.S. military budget. She compares disarmament with abolitionism: most people understood that slavery was evil and didn't know when it would end, but they realized that they had to work until it was eliminated. Forsberg's analysis of the country's 'defense dependency' and of the shortcomings of the nuclear-freeze movement she spearheaded is laced with her optimism about Soviet Union general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms. She has never abandoned her vision of an educated public that will prevail in 'demilitarizing international relations" to achieve a "secure, stable permanent peace.'

" This class explores the relationship between music and the supernatural, focusing on the social history and context of supernatural beliefs as reflected in key literary and musical works from 1600 to the present. Provides a better understanding of the place of ambiguity and the role of interpretation in culture, science and art. Explores great works of art by Shakespeare, Verdi, Goethe (in translation), Gounod, Henry James and Benjamin Britten. Readings will also include selections from the most recent scholarship on magic and the supernatural. Writing Assignments and Labs will range from web-based projects to analytic essays. No previous experience in music is necessary. Projected guest lectures, musical performances, field trips."

Christopher Lydon and Gail Harris host The Ten O'Clock News Election Night Special with in-studio guests Dennis Kearney (Suffolk County Sheriff), Dr. Alvin Poussaint (Harvard Medical School), Kirk Scharfenberg (The Boston Globe) and Michael Rezendes (The Boston Phoenix). Lydon, Harris and the guests analyze the voting results. Lydon calls the Flynn victory a 'landslide.' Poussaint talks about 'ethnic voting' in the white precincts. Lydon and Harris read the news headlines. Harris reports on an agreement between WGBH and the Massachusetts House of Representatives, which allows WGBH to broadcast live coverage of House proceedings. A panel discusses Ray Flynn's victory over Mel King in Boston's mayoral elections. Lydon, Harris and the in-studio guests talk about Flynn's victory. The guests discuss how Flynn will reach out to the African American community and how Flynn will deal with the business community. Scharfenberg notes that Flynn will need to appoint non-whites to some high-level positions in his administration. Rezendes criticizes the King campaign for not spending enough money on media advertising. The guests debate the role of race in the campaign. Poussaint believes that many white voters were frightened of King's appearance. The guests talk about whether the media downplayed racial issues during the campaign. They speculate about whether another African American candidate would have fared better than King.

Flyover of northern Florida as seen by SeaWiFS on June 22, 1998

From 1988 to 1993 nuclear physicist Mambillkalathil Govind Kumar Menon was president of the International Council of Scientific Unions, a non-governmental organization long involved in environmental and development issues. He was also India's minister of state for science and technology from 1986 to 1989, and he served in the Parliament from 1990 to 1996. In this video segment, Menon describes the euphoria following World War II when international cooperation on atomic science and technology flourished.In the interview Menon conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'The Haves and Have-Nots,' he offers reflections on the dynamic and visionary nuclear physicist Dr. Homi Bhabha. Dr. Bhabha saw the possibility for the modern development of India in creating programs that would harness the newly emerging technology of nuclear energy. Menon captures the zeal of scientists at the first United Nations Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. He also defines some basic nuclear processes and principles: how fission works, controlled and uncontrolled chain reactions, and the difference between generating nuclear energy and manufacturing weapons. In 1974, under the prime ministership of Indira Gandhi, India conducted an underground nuclear test. Menon defends what India called a peaceful nuclear explosion as a means to explore enhanced mining techniques and other feats of large-scale underground nuclear engineering. With equal enthusiasm, Menon describes the possibilities of India's space program for expanding telecommunications and gathering data for waterand land-resource management. The global threat, he maintains, is not India but a nuclear exchange between the two superpowers. Paraphrasing Indira Gandhi, Menon concludes, 'What we want is not to make deserts but to make deserts bloom.'

The concept of globalization fosters the understanding of the interconnectedness of cultures and societies geographically wide apart; America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. Subject scans existing debates over globalization in four continents. Explores how globalization impacts everyday life in the First and Third World; how globalization leads to a common cosmopolitan culture; the emergence of a global youth culture; and religious, social, and political movements that challenge globalization. Materials examined include pop music, advertisements, film posters, and political cartoons. Topic for Spring 2003: Popular Culture in Japan. Taught in English.

The Creole languages spoken in the Caribbean are linguistic by-products of the historical events triggered by colonization and the slave trade in Africa and the `New World'. In a nutshell, these languages are the results of language acquisition in the specific social settings defined by the history of contact between African and European peoples in 17th-/18th-century Caribbean colonies. One of the best known Creole languages, and the one with the largest community of speakers, is Haitian Creole. Its lexicon is primarily derived from varieties of French as spoken in 17th-/18th-century colonial Haiti; yet some of its structures seem to have emerged under the influence of African languages, mostly from West and Central Africa. And yet other properties seem to have no analogues in any of the source languages. Through a sample of linguistic case studies focusing on Haitian Creole morphosyntax, we will explore creolization from a cognitive, historical and comparative perspective. Using Haitian Creole and some of its Caribbean congeners as test cases, we will evaluate various hypotheses about the development of Creole languages and about the role of first- and second-language acquisition in such development. We will also explore the concept of Creolization in its non-linguistic senses. Then we will address questions of "Caribbean identities" by examining a sample of Creole speakers' attitudes toward the Creole language and the corresponding European language and toward the African and European components of their ethnic make-up.

21F.031 examines the terms "avant garde" and "Kulturindustrie" in French and German culture of the early twentieth century. Considering the origins of these concepts in surrealist and dadaist literature, art, and cinema, the course then expands to engage parallel formations across Europe, particularly in the former Soviet Union. Emphasis on the specific historical conditions that enabled these interventions. Guiding questions are these: What was original about the historical avant-garde? What connections between art and revolution did avant-garde writers and artists imagine? What strategies did they deploy to meet their modernist imperatives? To what extent did their projects maintain a critical stance towards the culture industry? Surveying key interventions in the fields of poetry, painting, sculpture, photography, film, and music, the readings also include signal moments in critical thought of the last century. Figures to be considered are: Adorno, Aragon, Bataille, Beckett, Brecht, Breton, BĚ_rger, Duchamp, Eisenstein, Ernst, JĚ_nger, Greenberg, Kandinsky, Malevich, Mayakovsky, and Tzara. Taught in English, but students are encouraged to consult original sources when possible.

This lesson focuses on the uses, shapes, importance, and historical storytelling on Greek vessels in art.