Examines the problems and issues confronting American national security policy since 1945, with special attention to the politics of policymaking. The nature of the international system (post-World War II), the theoretical requirements for deterrence and defense, and alternative strategies for implementing American national security policy are discussed. The roles of the President, National Security Council, Department of Defense and armed services, the Congress, and public opinion in formulating national security policy are examined. Subject fulfills undergraduate public policy requirement in the major and minor. Description from Course page: This course examines the problems and issues confronting American national security policymakers and the many factors that influence the policies that emerge. But this is not a course about "threats," military strategies, or the exercise of military power. What threatens those interests? How should the U.S. defend those interests? What kind of military should we build? Should the U.S. enter into alliances with other countries? Do we need a larger Navy? How much should we spend on weapons procurement? The course is organized along an historical time line. Beginning with the final days of World War II we follow American national security policy from the first stirrings of confrontation with the Soviet Union and China, into two hot wars in Asia that cost over 100,000 American lives and spawned social upheavals, through a close encounter with nuclear war, stumbling into the era of arms control, and conclude with the collapse of the communism. Selective case studies, memoirs, and original documents act as windows into each period. What were US national security decision makers thinking? What were they worried about? How did they see their options.

A survey of how America has become the world's largest consumer of energy. Explores American history from the perspective of energy and its relationship to politics, diplomacy, the economy, science and technology, labor, culture, and the environment. Topics include muscle and water power in early America, coal and the Industrial Revolution, electrification, energy consumption in the home, oil and US foreign policy, automobiles and suburbanization, nuclear power, OPEC and the 70's energy crisis, global warming, and possible paths for the future.

Helmut Schmidt became the head of Germany's Social Democratic Party in 1967 and deputy chairman of the party in 1968. Between 1969 and 1972, he served as defense minister, minister for economics and finance, and minister of finance. From 1974 to 1982, he was the chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany. In this video segment, Schmidt describes what he terms 'Euro-strategic' SS-20 missiles, which the Soviet Union began deploying along its western and southeastern borders in 1977. He viewed this deployment as destabilizing the nuclear balance in Europe, and he vigorously but unsuccessfully pressed President Jimmy Carter to include these missiles in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II negotiations. In the interview he conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'Carter's New World,' Schmidt recalls his anger and the political damage he suffered in 1978 when President Carter suddenly delayed his decision to produce the neutron bomb. He analyzes why the Soviet-U.S. relations deteriorated as the 1970s wore on, goes over Carter successor Ronald Reagan's initial receptivity to a 'zero-zero' option, relays the subsequent internal dissension and ascendancy of hardliners within the Reagan administration, and sheds light on the shift within the administration toward arms reductions. He recounts his conviction that the threat of deploying U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles in response to the threat of the Soviet SS-20s brought the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. The Guadeloupe meeting that Schmidt helped organize produced the 'double-track decision' that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) council adopted at the end of 1979: to deploy the U.S. intermediate-range missiles while simultaneously bargaining them away in Geneva. Unlike some of his counterparts, Schmidt never feared the 'de-coupling' of the U.S. strategic deterrent from the defense of NATO Europe. He remained, though, keenly sensitive to the concentration of nuclear weapons deployed by other countries in the Federal Republic. In his interview, Schmidt explains the need for European collaboration in building up conventional forces to achieve both nuclear and non-nuclear parity between the Warsaw and NATO blocs.

This site opens a window into the lives of American diplomats and U.S. foreign policy -- how it is formulated in Washington and implemented at our embassies abroad. Transcripts of more than 1,300 interviews with U.S. diplomatic personnel capture their experiences, motivations, personal analyses, and private thoughts.

General Gerd Schmuckle served in the Federal Republic of Germany's Ministry of Defense from 1956 to 1962 under defense minister Franz Josef Strauss. Strauss was charged with building up the Bundeswehr, the newly formed federal armed forces. In this video segment, Schmuckle describes Germany's reaction to the U.S. doctrine of massive retaliation, which de-emphasized a conventional buildup-one that Germans advocated-and depended on thousands of nuclear warheads deployed on German soil. When French president Charles de Gaulle returned to power in 1958, his main concern-developing an independent national deterrent-halted a preliminary treaty for Franco-German nuclear cooperation. Germany had little choice but to acquiesce to deterrence as formulated by the United States. In the interview he conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'The Education of Robert McNamara,' Schmuckle elaborates on these and other topics. In building up the Bundeswehr, Strauss pushed to have some voice in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decision-making, worked to overcome European mistrust of a rearmed Germany, and fought to regain its stature in Europe. Unsure whether exclusive reliance on a U.S. nuclear deterrent would be sustainable in the long term, Schmuckle recaps Germany's efforts to build a pan-European defense force-a proposal that failed to gain traction. He also supported NATO general Lauris Norstad's proposal that NATO become a fourth nuclear power. However, Britain's 1957 white paper Defense: Outline of Future Policy announced the island's intent to build an independent nuclear deterrent and reduce troop levels in Germany, which quashed the notion of NATO as a major nuclear power. The following year, de Gaulle proclaimed developing an independent nuclear force his government's highest priority. As a result, Schmuckle explains, Germans haven't significantly influenced the stationing of nuclear warheads and NATO decision-making. He recalls opposing U.S. secretary of defense Robert McNamara's theories of escalating warfare and preemptive strikes, and he protested against a dramatic increase in conventional forces, which he regarded as totally unrealistic. In the age of nuclear weapons, Schmuckle asserts, 'war does not make any sense any longer in Europe.'

Denis Healey was the British secretary of state for defense from 1964 to 1970 and chancellor of the exchequer from 1974 to 1979. In this video segment, Healey reflects on the period in which he was defense secretary under Prime Minister Harold Wilson. He recalls the opposing interests of Germany and the United States with regard to nuclear strategy, explains his 'Healey theorem' of deterrence, and clarifies France's position that alliances can't coexist with nuclear weapons. Healey also assesses U.S. defense secretary Robert McNamara's quest for tidy solutions to 'insoluble' nuclear problems. In his interview conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'The Education of Robert McNamara,' Healey begins with a comparison between Soviet and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) conventional military strength. He elaborates on France's opposition to the notion of 'extended deterrence' and on his own role in persuading NATO to adopt 'flexible response' strategy. He traces the evolution of his military analysis of massive retaliation, describes his collaboration with McNamara in developing flexible-response doctrine, reiterates the expectation that SALT III would follow shortly after a ratified SALT II Treaty, and shares how he ultimately lost faith in flexible response. He also discusses the extraordinary growth of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, Britain's response to the proposal for a Multilateral Force in the early 1960s, German chancellor Helmut Schmidt's distrust of U.S. president Jimmy Carter, and his own opposition to U.S. Euro-strategic missiles. As a fellow defense intellectual, Healey was encouraged by national security adviser Henry Kissinger's appointment: he was sure that detente could move forward. He admired Kissinger's boldness in dodging 'all official channels which he doesn't like anybody else doing,' but he was disappointed by Kissinger's failure to consult with allies. For the future, Healey believes that there should be fifty-percent reductions in strategic and conventional weapons, particularly when 'one side or the other has superiority.' He also advocates a 'nuclear-free corridor' to avoid accidental war.

Edward L. Rowny was the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) from 1972 to 1979. From 1981 to 1984, during U.S. president Ronald Reagan's administration, he was chief negotiator for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). In this video segment, Rowny explores Soviet and American negotiating tactics and proposals. He also shares his frustration with U.S. concessions, process, and misconceptions of Soviet thinking, all of which ultimately led to his resignation after the SALT II Treaty was signed. In his interview conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'One Step Forward,' Rowny describes why the Joint Chiefs of Staff selected him to join the SALT II delegation. He also discusses his misgivings about Paul Warnke, chief negotiator during President Jimmy Carter's administration. Rowny supported the initial proposal that the United States presented in Moscow in March 1977, which would have reduced Soviet heavy missiles by half. Had the U.S. team persevered, he maintains, it would have secured the agreement and successfully closed the 'window of vulnerability' facing U.S. land-based missiles. Although he was not alone in his objections to the SALT II Treaty, others endorsed it as a modest but useful step to a further agreement. The tipping point for Rowny came in the 1978 Christmas negotiations, during which the Soviets retained the right to encrypt signals for their missile tests. In the end, Rowny viewed the treaty as a 'chasm' and an 'impediment' for three reasons. First, it granted the Soviets the unilateral right to heavy missiles. Second, it discounted the intercontinental capabilities of the Soviet Backfire bomber, which was the focus of a hotly contested arms-control debate that Rowny explores in his interview. Third, permitting the missile-test encryption created a loophole in U.S. verification of Soviet compliance. Rowny also criticizes the timing of opening relations with China, and he maintains the inevitability of some degree of linkage between arms control and other areas of U.S.-Soviet relations. He concludes his interview with his take on how to conduct successful negotiations with the Soviet Union.

This survey course can be used by students who are looking to take just one general overview course or by those who want to go on to more advanced study in any of the subfields that comprise the political science discipline, such as American politics, comparative politics, international politics, or political theory. The goal of this course is to introduce the student to the discipline's concepts, terminology, and methods and to explore instances of applied political science through real world examples. Upon successful completion of this course, the student will be able to: Describe and evaluate the concepts of power, legitimacy, and authority; Discuss the origins and developments of the nation-state; Distinguish between traditional and behavioral approaches to the study of politics; Discuss general approaches to the study of politics, such as political philosophy, political systems theory, and political economy; Describe and discuss the political socialization process; Examine the nature of political participation from a comparative perspective; Discuss the nature of public opinion from a comparative perspective; Identify the different types of electoral systems and be able to assess the implications of those systems; Identify the role and functions of political parties; Identify the different types of party systems from a comparative perspective; Describe and evaluate the general principles of presidential and parliamentary political systems; Describe and compare the essential features of at least three governments of Western Europe; Identify and evaluate the principles of authoritarian and totalitarian governments; Discuss the concepts of political development and problems facing developing nations; Discuss and explain the origins and principles of democratic capitalism, democratic socialism, Marxist socialism, national socialism, fascism, and third world ideologies; Describe the origins, development, and principles of international law; Identify and assess the influence of major international organizations; Describe and analyze the causes of international conflict; Analyze current critical issues in international relationships. (Political Science 101)

Explores Japan's role in world orders, past, present, and future. Focuses on Japanese conceptions of security; rearmament debates; the relationship of domestic politics to foreign policy; the impact of Japanese technological and economic transformation at home and abroad; alternative trade and security regimes; and relations with Asian neighbors, Russia, and the alliance with the United States. Seminar culminates in a two-day Japanese-centered crisis simulation, based upon scenarios developed by students.

Ambassador Ryukichi Imai-journalist, nuclear engineer, and general manager at Japan Atomic Power Company-was Japanese ambassador to the United Nations Disarmament Conference from 1982 to 1987. In this video segment, Imai explains why he believes that Japan will never embark on a nuclear-weapons program. He also predicts that, while Japan stands alone in its reliance on nuclear energy, rising energy prices-even post-Chernobyl-will revive worldwide interest in nuclear power. In the interview he conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'Have and Have-nots,' Imai describes a career in which he became an expert on nuclear energy and non-proliferation in ways that paralleled Japan's stages of harnessing and expanding its reliance on atomic energy. Employed by Japan Atomic Power Company at the first commercial nuclear-power station in the country, Imai worked with the International Atomic Energy Agency to develop safeguards for nuclear technologies. He recalls that in the 1950s, few talked about the link between nuclear energy and weapons. He describes testifying on behalf of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which Japan debated for six years before ratifying. Debate centered on whether Japan should have the right to arm itself and on the high costs of safeguards that would handicap industry in the global market. Imai argued in support of the NPT, and he did not want to jeopardize the 1951 mutual-security treaty with the United States that he regarded as paramount to Japan's safety. When U.S. president Jimmy Carter opposed Japan's first reprocessing plant at Tokai, it was Imai whom the Japanese government sent to the United States. There he successfully negotiated a solution with former colleague Joseph Nye, then deputy to the undersecretary of state for security assistance, science, and technology.

Dean Rusk-the sole cabinet member addressed by President John F. Kennedy as 'Mr. Secretary'-was the second-longest-serving secretary of state: his service spanned the Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations, from 1961 to 1969. This video segment illustrates Rusk and Kennedy's close relationship during the Cuban missile crisis and conveys the president's emotions and approach to decision-making as events unfolded. His interview conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age: 'At the Brink' reveals Rusk to have been a very trusted adviser whose counsel was reserved for the president. While Rusk was part of the Executive Committee inner circle during the missile crisis, he was also a separate entity: he reserved his recommendation 'until the president and I heard from all of these working groups.' Throughout the two-week crisis, Rusk avidly pursued a diplomatic resolution, helped build consensus, and facilitated out-of-channel communications. Beyond the missile crisis, Rusk talks about European fears that the United States' commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would be weakened by the 'flexible response' strategy.

Andrei Gromyko served as Soviet foreign minister from 1957 to 1985. Beginning in 1943, when Soviet premier Joseph Stalin appointed the 34-year-old ambassador to Washington, Gromyko was an indispensable formulator of Kremlin policy toward the United States. Ultimately, he dealt with nine U.S. presidents. In this video segment, Gromyko chronicles the arms race, beginning in the 1950s under General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. At the time, each superpower had the ability to inflict "unacceptable damage" on the other. Still, neither side acted to stop the arms race until General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev opened the new era in the mid eighties. Under the leadership of Gorbachev, Gromyko concludes, Soviets have embraced the "principle of rational sufficiency" and initiated unilateral steps to stop the arms race. The interview Gromyko conducted for War and Peace in the Nuclear Age is a wide-ranging reflection on nuclear strategy, foreign policy, and superpower diplomacy during the four-and-a-half decades since the dawn of the nuclear age. Gromyko begins the interview with a look at the Potsdam Conference, at which U.S. president Harry S. Truman informed Soviet premier Joseph Stalin that an atomic bomb had successfully detonated. Truman was perplexed by the non-reaction of the Soviet leader, who then submitted a private order to accelerate the Russian bomb project. Gromyko remembers how, following the war, it felt, at age 37, to challenge the experienced architects of the Cold War and the policies they conceived: the Baruch Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan. He recalls that Soviet proposals to ban all nuclear weapons and to place strict controls on facilities pursuing nuclear energy were "categorically rejected." Western powers, Gromyko asserts, missed the opportunity to stop the arms race before it began. He points to "a drastic hardening" of foreign policy, citing former Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill's 1946 "Iron Curtain" speech as an "open declaration of the Cold War." Gromyko reserves his strongest criticism for the "doctrine of intimidation," the United States' classified National Security Memorandum 68, which marked a dramatic shift in U.S.-Soviet relations. His description of the 1962 Caribbean crisis stands in stark contrast to U.S. officials' accounts of the same episode, known as the Cuban missile crisis. He provides detailed recollections of his conversation with President John F. Kennedy during this period, concluding that it was "probably the most difficult meeting I experienced in all my 48 years of meeting presidents of the United States." Gromyko moves ahead to the period of detente. His retelling of last-minute changes prior to the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I differs from that of national security adviser Henry Kissinger. Gromyko discusses the key Soviet objection to U.S. proposals during SALT II negotiations: the United States, which targeted the Soviet Union with forward bases around the world, demanded drastic reductions in the Soviet Union's principal deterrent-the heavy intercontinental ballistic missile. At Vladivostok in 1974, the two sides agreed on a basic framework for the SALT II Treaty, which was signed five years later. Reflecting on the trends he has observed during his long career as Soviet foreign minister, Gromyko sees more continuity than difference: each administration has tried to achieve military superiority, and the Soviet Union, always one step behind, has pressed to maintain "virtual parity" to safeguard its national interests. Much was achieved during detente, he recalls. While that term is no longer used, Gromyko sees parallels with-and holds out hope for-the current process of "deepening mutual understand and trust."

Harry McPherson was special counsel to U.S. president Lyndon B. Johnson from 1966 to 1969. In this video segment, McPherson captures the thinking behind Johnson's internal stalemate: his anguish over the Vietnam War; his diminished political strength; his tension-filled relationship with newly appointed defense secretary Clark Clifford, who pushed to de-escalate; and Johnson's own inability to let go. In the interview he conducted for Vietnam: A Television History, 'Tet 1968,' McPherson provides an intimate portrait of that year in the White House. He describes conversations in which he participated; President Johnson's state of mind; and the impact on the administration as 'contributing nation' allies, Congress, advisers, and public opinion turned against the war. McPherson begins the interview by recalling the conflicted mood at the White House following the Tet Offensive. The optimism found in military cables and official information clashed with televised images showing the nation that the war was resulting in massive loss of human life and that a prisoner could be shot at point-blank range. McPherson's account also follows the internal politics of the Johnson administration from 1964 to 1966. President Johnson's domestic agenda was swallowed by a war he doubted privately; U.S. involvement in Vietnam deepened considerably even as public confidence eroded; Democrats suffered midterm-election defeats. Defense secretary Robert McNamara, who was a key architect of U.S. policy in Vietnam, became convinced that the war was unwinnable and resigned shortly after Tet. McPherson remembers a luncheon at which McNamara, his voice breaking, spoke of the 'crushing futility' of the air campaign that he 'had ultimate responsibility for.' The arrival of Clark Clifford as the new defense secretary set in motion a sea change of opinion in the White House-namely the recognition, finally, that continuing to escalate troop levels was doing nothing to stem North Vietnam's war of attrition with the United States. McPherson recounts his burgeoning alliance with Secretary Clifford, who stated, 'Together we'll get this country and our president out of this mess.' McPherson talks in great detail about the three-month process of writing the president's pivotal speech to be televised at the end of March. He recalls reworking drafts as the administration debated whether to continue, increase, or selectively arrest bombing as a prelude to peace talks a proposal that McPherson presented and that was eventually adopted. Given the change in policy, the speech required a new ending, which Johnson himself decided to write. On March 31, 1968, the president stunned the world with his announcement that he would not seek reelection. Reflecting on the Vietnam experience, McPherson probes the feasibility of fighting a limited war. He ends his interview with a personal sketch of President Johnson, a complex and tragic figure. McPherson considered him brilliant in 'sheer intellectual mental horsepower' and 'the smartest man I ever saw.'